Applying Math to Romance

I’m taking a break from studying anatomy to present you with a trifecta of math papers to brighten up your day!

The first deals with “The Carol Syndrome”, a common experience to many single women. You’re smart, attractive, and available (or at least you think you are). So, why are so few men willing to approach you? José-Manuel Rey believes that it’s actually the rational thing for men to do. I’ll summarize here without going into the mathy details, but feel free to click through to the paper. Imagine the payoff as 1 if the woman accepts the man’s overtures and 0 if she rejects him. If the man chooses not to approach, he can do something else with his time and receive payoff somewhere between 0 and 1. The only reason he would have to approach is if he feels the probability of acceptance is greater than his payoff if he doesn’t accept (based on expected utility). Now, how would you calculate that probability? The article goes into depth, but in short, if you as a man are blind to how many competitors there are, it’s most likely that an attractive woman is not available. Even if she is, the number of competitors ensures that there her choosing your candidacy is slim. The only rational thing to do is to ignore her.

The second is about information overload, the Nash Equilibrium, and flirtatious men. This time, men are not behaving rationally by approaching multiple women in the course of an evening, as common sense would dictate. The ideal would be to have a strategy in place with optimal success given the available information. Then, over the course of the evening, only change strategies (hitting on someone else) if there is a shift in information (people pairing up, getting rejected). Even then, it is only wise to do so when the expected rewards are greater than the upheaval cost of changing strategies (women notice that you’re changing your target). Because of imperfect information, men in real life are quite skittish and, fearing the worst, are quite liable to change strategies more than they should.

The third article describes how to decide on an optimal strategy of mate selection with one’s given standards. This seems to be an extension of the stable marriage problem but takes into account reality (you can’t meet everyone) and incomplete information (how can you rank someone instantly?). The models of players in this game interact and again, the plight of imperfect information strikes. Given the situation, the article describes some of the expected outcomes and how each strategy will pan out given a healthy dose of reality. Sorry for giving a vague description, but you really have to click through to sample the delicious content and witty presentation.